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SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
COLEMAN KARESH*
Lease - Mortgage
In Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Port Oil Co.,' a
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case arising from the East-
ern District of South Carolina, one of the questions at issue
was whether a lease and lease-back arrangement between
the plaintiff, a supplier of petroleum products, and the de-
fendant, a distributor, was in the nature of a mortgage. The
facts are exceedingly complex. Briefly, however, the salient
circumstances in this connection were that the defendant
leased certain filling station sites to the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff leased back the sites to the defendant. The purpose
was to enable the defendant to secure credit to erect build-
ings on the sites, the loans obtained by the defendant to be
secured by the rents from the plaintiff. There were other
agreements under which the defendant agreed to fill its re-
quirements exclusively by purchases from the plaintiff, with
a specification of minimum purchases. In the event of breach
by the defendant of the provisions of the distributorship agree-
ments the plaintiff was to have the right to cancel the lease-
backs and repossess the sites.
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover posses-
sion of the sites on the ground that the defendant had re-
pudiated its agreement. The District Court held for the de-
fendant on the ground that there had been violation by the
plaintiff of its part of the agreement and of another related
agreement, and - more relevant here - that the lease and
lease-back arrangement, and the other agreements, constituted
a mortgage or mortgages of the stations, which would be dis-
charged upon payment by the defendant of the construction
loans, and that such payment or its tender - which the de-
fendant was willing and able to make - gave the defendant
the right to retake the stations and entitled it to a cancellation
of the leases and lease-backs.
The Court of Appeals reversed. On the mortgage feature it
declared that the arrangement did not constitute a mortgage.
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 301 F. 2d 175 (1961).
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The court pointed out that the defendant owed nothing in
money to the plaintiff except the lease-back rent, and the
plaintiff was not endorser of the defendant's loans, nor had
it assumed any responsibility for the defendant which would
create a right of indemnity for which security might have
been afforded. The only mortgage or pledge relationship,
the court observed, was between the defendant and the banks
from which it had borrowed - the security being the rents
assigned.
The other aspects of reversal and questions for determina-
tion on remand need not be noted here, since they are not
essentially related to the security element of the case.
Suretyship - Constructiou
In the period under survey two cases were decided dealing
with the scope and coverage of contractors' bonds. In one
of them there is the' additional question of the effect of the
principal's bankruptcy and discharge upon the surety's i-
ability.
In S. C. Supply & Equipment Co. v. James Stewart & Co.,2
the action was against a contractor. and his surety. The de-
fendant contractor was not the original contractor but had
taken over the work by consent of all the parties. The bond
was a standard American Institute of American Architects
labor and material bond, under which there was the obligation
to "promptly make payment to all claimants as hereinafter
defined, for all labor and material used or reasonably required
in the performance of the contract." A claimant was de-
fined as:
S.. one having a direct contract with the principal or
with a sub-contractor of the principal for labor, material,
or both, used or reasonably required for use in the per-
formance of the contract, labor and material being con-
strued to include that part of water, gas, power, light
heat, oil, gasoline, telephone service or rental of equip-
ment directly applicable to the contract.
The plaintiff had leased scaffolding equipment for use on
the project to the original contractor. The equipment was
used by the substituted contractor - the named defendant-
but not all of it was returned to the plaintiff. This action was
2. 238 S. C. 106, 119 S. E. 2d 106 '(1961).
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brought against the named defendant and the surety for
unpaid rent and for damages for conversion arising out of
the failure to return all the scaffolding.
The lower court held against both defendants for unpaid
rent and for damages for conversion. The Supreme Court
affirmed as to the named defendant (whose defense was
that he was acting only as agent for the original contractor)
but reversed as to the surety as to damages for the failure
to return equipment. Concerning rent unpaid, the Court held
that it was specifically covered by the terms of the bond.
As to the scaffolding, the Court held that the case was gov-
erned by the principles stated in Kline v. McMeekin Constr.
Co.,3 which draws the distinction between:
. . . labor and materials consumed in the work or in
connection therewith and those made use of in furnish-
ing the so-called contractor's plant'and available not only
for the particular contract but for other work. Tools,
machinery and appliances used by the contractor, al-
though worn out in the progress of the work, are not such
labor and materials as are ordinarily contemplated by-
contractor's bonds.
The Court held that the scaffolding was a part of "tools-,
machinery and appliances used by the contractor," and was
an item in his plant. The fact that the item was leased, rather
than purchased, made it no less a part of his plant - nor
did the fact that it was leased only to be used on the particular
project make a difference.
the case of Dominion Culvert & Metal Corp. v. United
States F. & G. Co.4 was concerned with the scope of the bond
and with the effect on the surety's liability of the discharge
in bankruptcy of a sub-contractor. The action was brought
against the surety by an unpaid supplier of materials fur-
nished to a sub-contractor who had worked on a public con-
struction contract. The ,facts, briefly, were that after the
oub-contractor had gone into bankruptcy, the-prime contractor
paid to the trustee in bankruptcy the balance due the sub-
contractor and received a release from the obligee of the
bond and the trustee in bankruptcy. The plaintiff filed its
claim in bankruptcy as a common creditor and received a
pro rata dividend. It thereafter brought this action to recover
3. 220 S. C. 281, 67 S. E. 2d 304 (1951).
4. 238 S. C. 452,120 S. E. 2d 518 (1961).
[Vol. 15
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the balance. It was non-suited. On appeal the lower court
was reversed.
The Supreme Court disposed preliminarily of the question
whether the plaintiff was within the scope of the bond as to
persons protected. The bond undertook that the contractor
would pay all persons furnishing labor and materials, and
also that "all persons who have furnished labor and material
shall have a direct action on the bond." In this aspect the
Court held that materials furnished the sub-contractor came
within the purview of the bond, stating:
It is now settled by the decisions of this court that a
contractor and the surety on his bond, given to secure
payment for labor and materials furnished in the con-
struction of a public improvement, whether the bond be
required by statute or not, are liable not only for labor
and materials furnished to the contractor, but also for
those furnished to a sub-contractor [citing cases]
and that a materialman may bring a direct action against
the surety on such bond [citing cases].
The privilege of direct action is strengthened, it is to be
noted, by the bond provision that the right shall exist in
favor of those persons.
Turning to the effect of the". bankruptcy, the Court held
that the insolvency of the sub-ontractor did not affect the
surety's liability, and that i was . isk which the prime
contractor and the surety assumed, and as to which they could
.. have protected themselves by the procurement of bond or
other security from the sub-contractor. The Court also held
that the fact that the contractor had paid the full amount
owing the sub-contractor and had obtained a release from
both the trustee in bankruptcy and the obligee did not work
a discharge of the contractor or the surety, the Court adopt-
Ang what it regarded as the majority'rule, which is based
* upon the obligations assumed by the contractor and his
surety, under their contracts with the owner, to those fur-
nishing labor and materials for the construction." Further,
the Court held, the filing of a claim by the plaintiff with
the trustee in bankruptcy and receipt of a dividend did not
relieve the surety, the conclusion being based largely on 11
U. S. C. A. § 34: "The liability of a person who is a co-debtor
with, or guarantor, or in any manner a surety for the bank-
rupt shall not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt."
1962],
4
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The Court points out that discharge of the bankrupt is per-
sonal to him and, particularly in view of the Bankruptcy
Act (the section quoted), does not relieve the surety. This
result is not altered by the filing of claim and participation
in the bankrupt's estate, except to the extent of reducing
liability by what has been received.
Motor Vehicle Title Act
In the period under survey three cases were decided in
which the applicability of the Motor Vehicle Title Registra-
tion Act," originally enacted in 1957,6 was brought into ques-
tion or mention. A close analysis of the provisions of the
Act is not necessary or feasible here. The facts in each of
the cases are relatively simple.
In the first of the cases, Clanton's Auction Sales, Inc. v.
Harvin,7 the plaintiff, an automobile wholesaler owning two
Volkswagen automobiles acquired by it from a dealer in
Pennsylvania, with accompanying Pennsylvania certificates
of title, delivered the two cars to the named defendant, who
was a dealer. This was in February, 1960. The defendant
was to pay for them by check to be sent the next day, the
plaintiff retaining the Pennsylvania certificates and all other
indicia of title, intending to keep them until paid by the pur-
chaser. The defendant mortgaged one of the cars - the one in-
volved in this action - to Stephenson Finance Company, which
shortly afterwards rec6rded its mortgage. The defendant :did
not pay the plaintiff, and a few days after the transaction he
was committed to a mental institution. The. action was
brought by the plaintiff to recover possession of the car.
Stephenson Finance Company claimed the right to possession
as a subsequent bona fide encumbrancer for value with-
out notice, alleging that. the plaintiff had attempted a res-
ervation of title which did not comply with the Bailment
Statute,6 which requires that reservations of title by a seller
be reduced to writing and recorded in the manner provided
by law for the recording of chattel mortgages. It further
pleaded waiver and estoppel. The lower court, to which
the case had been submitted by consent for trial without a
5. CODE OF LAWS OF Sorr CAROLINA, §§ 46-139--46-139.61 (1952).
6. Act No. 402,50 Stat. 595 (1957).
7. 238 S. C. 352, 120 S. E. 2d 287 (1961).
8. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUT .CAROLINA § 57-808 (1952). For a late
amendment to the Statute, see under Legislation hlreafter.
[Vol. 15
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jury on an agreed statement of facts, held for Stephenson,
without referring to the Title Act. The grounds for so hold-
ing were that the Bailment Statute was applicable to the facts
of the case, and that, in addition, the plaintiff by delivering
the car to a known dealer in automobiles was estopped to
assert its claim against the mortgagee of the dealer.
The Supreme Court affirmed for substantially the same
reasons as those given by the lower court. The Court stated
the plaintiff's position to be that by retaining indicia of
ownership, all other persons, including the finance company,
were placed on notice that the party in possession of the car
might not have title. To this the Court answered:
It must be remembered that all parties were aware of
the other's business, that both Clanton's Auto Auction
Sales, Inc. and Harvin were known automobile dealers
engaged in the sale and financing of cars, and that this
was known to Stephenson Finance Company. Plaintiff
knew or should have known that Harvin, being a dealer,
would in the normal course of business either finance
or sell. Ordinarily one in possession of personal property
is presumed to be the owner and one purchasing such
property is required to use only reasonable diligence to
ascertain if there are any defects in the title thereto.
Russell Willis, Inc. v. Page, 213 S. C. 156, 48 S. E. (2d)
627 [1948]. 9
One can hardly object to the proposition that the Bailment
Statute covered the case, since the plaintiff here had re-
served an interest which was not reduced to writing and
recorded. There may be some dissent, however, from the
proposition that in surrendering a car to a known dealer,
the person delivering might be assumed to be aware that
the other might sell or mortgage it. Even where an agency
is created under which the agent-is to sell, there is no implica-
tion that he has authority to mortgage, and persons deal-
9. In this case, however,.the possessor of a car had obtained it from
the plaintiff on the fraudulent representation that he was acting as agent
for a purchasing principal, giving the plaintiff a check in the asserted
principal's name. In the transaction the plaintiff delivered a bill of sale
made out in the principal's name. The car was thereafter involved in a
wreck and was sold to the defendant, who did not know of the prior cir-
cumstances. In the purchase the bill of sale was exhibited to the defendant,
by the seller, who represented himself as the person named in the bill of
sale. It will be noted that the seller (the counterfeit principal) had more
than mere possession of the car; he bad some indicia of ownership, although
fraudulently obtained.
1962]
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ing with him, as ostensible owner, are not protected in tak-
ing a mortgage. 10 Mere possession, it would seem from the
cases, is not enough to give rise to an estoppel. Even, too,
if the reservation of interest had been put into writing and
recorded, the fact of permitting a purchaser to hold the
chattel for trade would carry the implication, whether there
was or not an express agreement as well, that the reserver
or mortgagee consented to the sale of the property free of
the lien or reserved interest. This, rather than estoppel,
seems to be the true ground for the holdings in those cases".
protecting purchasers from a dealer, although estoppel is
mentioned in the cases. The principles of implied consent
and estoppel, leading to the same result, are related, except
that estoppel to deny ownership in one apparently having it
would extend to both sale and mortgage by him; while con-
sent would seem to be limited to sales.
The plaintiff's exceptions and appeal were directed to the
contention that the transaction was covered by the Motor
Vehicle Title Act. The Supreme Court took note of the
argument, but disposed of it unfavorably by pointing to Sec-
tion 22 of the Act (§ 46-139.81, South Carolina Code, 1952,
Supp.), which provides that the act "does not apply to or affect
... a security interest created by a manufacturer or dealer
who holds the vehicle of sale ..... " It also directed attention
to the fact - and by itself it would seem to be controlling -
that at the time of the transaction the Motor Vehicle Title
Act provided that security interests perfected under the
10. Evans v. Pendarvis, 124 S. C. 489, 117 S. E. 716 (1923), car delivered
to agent to sell, agent represented he was owner and mortgaged to one
unaware of facts; holding also that Bailment Statute was inapplicable.
The case is based largely on Carmichael v. Buck, 12 Rich. Law 451 (S. C.
1860). Evans v. Pendarvis was followed in Standard Motors Finance Co.
V. Sansbury, 152 S. C. 313, 149 S. E. 597 (1929).
11. Cudd v. Rogers, 111 S. C. 507, 98 S. E. 796 (1918); Harper v. Aber-
crombie, 115 S. C. 360, 105 S. E. 749 (1920), mortgage recorded, estoppel
to assert agency which had previously existed; Manufacturers' Finance Co.
v. Boyd, 128 S. C. 339, 122 S. E. 496 (1924), in which it is suggested
(p. 343) that if subsequent bill of sale by mortgagor of cars had been
taken as speurity, instead of representing purchase, transferee might not
be protected; International Agric. Corp. v. Lockhart, 181 S. C. 501, 188
S. E. 243 (1936), in which is recognized the rule that mortgagee authoriz-
ing sale in due course of trade impliedly consents to sale free of lien;
Atlas Fin. Co. v. Credit Co., 216 S. C. 151, 57 S. E. 2d 65 (1949), in which'
mortgagee of particular car was held impliedly to have consented to sale
free of lien, with protection to mortgagee of purchaser. This last case was
cited by the circuit judge as being sufficiently analogous to the present
case to control it, but the mortgagee of the purchaser was protected be-
cause the purchaser was protected. This is not a case in which, like the
present one, the dealer gave the mortgage.
[Vol. 15
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act were also required to be recorded under the terms of the
General Recording Act.12 This provision for additional or
continued recordation was repealed in the 1960 legislative
session,"3 and an amendment was added to the section which
requires perfection of security interests to the effect that
"No other recordation shall be necessary to protect the in-
terest of the lienholders."' 4 The repeal and amendment came
after the transaction involved. Accordingly, the failure to
record by the plaintiff would protect the subsequent mort-
gagee. The argument of the plaintiff appears to be that,
nonetheless, the failure of the seeming owner to furnish a
certificate or other indicia of title put his mortgagee upon
notice of his lack of ownership - very much like the inquiry
notice charging a subsequent party with notice of ultimate
facts despite non-recordation. This contention in substance
was rejected by the overall holding penalizing the seller for
delivering the car to the purchaser and creating the impres-
sion of ownership in him, with an additional observation
that there was no evidence of actual or constructive notice
as to the mortgage.
The second of the three cases (though last decided),
Clanton Auction Sales, Inc. v. Young,15 was a companion case
to the first, in that it involved the other of the two cars
delivered by Clanton to Harvin. The facts were the same
except that here Harvin sold the car to Young. The lower
court, granting a directed verdict for the plaintiff, held that
the Motor Vehicle Title Act laid down a "hard and fast rule"
which called for compliance with its terms and that the
innocence of the purchaser would not alter the result. Sub-
sequently to this holding the case of Clanton's Auction Sales,
Inc. v. Harvin, just reviewed, was decided by the Supreme
Court. In the appeal in the present case, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court, declaring that its decision was
based on the decision in Harvin, and the fact that in that case
the transaction was a mortgage and in this case a sale was
12. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 60-101 (1952). The provision
calling for this recordation was in § 25 of the act as passed in 1957, ap-
pearing as § 46-139.83 in the Supplement to the 1952 Code. The companion
action of the legislature was the omission from the act as proposed of a
provision eliminating the necessity for recording. See comment in 10
S.C.L.Q. 125 (1957).
13. Act No. 744, 51 Stat. 1730 (1960).
14. Act No. 744, 51 Stat. 1730 (1960), amending § 23 of Act 402 of
1957, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 46-139.82 (1952).
15. 239 S. C. 250, 122 S. E. 2d 640 (1961).
1962] 209
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 18
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/18
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of no consequence.16 The Court was of the opinion, follow-
ing the lead of the earlier case, that there was estoppel
against the plaintiff. Although the Court might have disposed
of the case solely on the ground that recordation, at the time
of the transaction, was required, and perhaps, as did the
earlier case, hold that the act did not in any event affect
the transaction, it undertook to discuss the question whether,
in the face of the act, an estoppel may be invoked by one
who has purchased without requiring the seller to produce
and assign a certificate of title. The Court observed that
there was a conflict of authority on the point:
Some courts take the view that the terms of the statute
are mandatory and must be complied with to effect a
valid transfer of title. They hold that estoppel may
not be invoked to defeat the title of the registered owner,
and that any person who purchases a motor vehicle with-
out requiring the seller to exhibit and assign his title is
guilty of negligence and is not a-bona fide purchaser ....
On the other hand, it is held in a number of juris-
dictions that the title registration acts do not preclude
application of the general principles of equitable estoppel.
The Court then took the momentous step of accepting the
latter view, basing it to a certain extent upon the view that
the local act is not as drastic as those, or some of those, acts
as against which estoppel is denied. The South Carolina
act, the Court points out, "merely provides that a transfer
without compliance with its terms 'is not effective' - Section
46-139.52." It added, "We find nothing in it indicating a
legislative intent to abrogate the plea of equitable estoppel.
It was never contemplated that this statute which was ob-
viously intended to prevent fraudulent transfer of cars should
be applied so as to protect one whose conduct has enabled
another to commit a fraud."
The respondent was granted permission to criticize and
seek modification of certain language in Harvi, which it con-
tended was an erroneous characterization of the nature and
effect of a title registration certificate. The Court held
16. Of course the case is all the stronger where the dealer sells, as dis-
tinguished from his mortgaging. As already seen, a mortgagee, by per-
mitting the mortgagor to engage in trade with the affected chattel, im-
pliedly consents to its sale free of his lien. The possible objections to a
mortgage do not hold as to a sale.
[Vol. 15
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that the respondent had misconstrued the language, and that
the question had no bearing on the view it took of the case.1'7
The third of the cases, Ex Parte Dort,1s brought in 1959,
was very much like the Harvin case. The action was brought
by Stephenson Finance Company against one Wingard to
recover possession of several cars mortgaged to it by Wingard,
a used car dealer. Dort intervened, making claim to one
of the cars. His claim was based on the fact that he had
sold the car to Wingard, who had given a check in payment.
Dort's agent in making the sale, had retained the buyer's
bill of sale - which had been signed by both seller and buyer
and the certificate of title, intending to keep them until
the check was paid. In the meantime Wingard borrowed from
Stephenson, giving a mortgage on the car sold by Dort,
Stephenson recording shortly afterwards. The check was
later returned unpaid. On trial the jury found for Dort,
but the trial judge granted a motion for Stephenson non
obstante veredicto.
The Supreme Court sustained the lower court, principally
under the provisions of the Bailment Statute,19 holding that
even if there were a memorandum of sale, it amounted to a
reservation of interest which was not effective for want of
recording. The appellant contended that the retention of the
written evidence of ownership by him put Stephenson on
notice of the purchaser's possible lack of title, but the
Court concluded that the statute, and the General Record-
ing Act,2 0 controlled the case; and that both parties being
automobile dealers, Dort must have known that in the normal
course of business Wingard "would either sell or finance the
automobile" 2'1 The decision is based largely upon Russell
Willis, Inc. v. Page,22 relied upon so heavily in Harvin. The
conclusion was that, under the circumstances, there was
estoppel, and that in applying it, the Court was doing no
more than giving recognition to the "two innocent parties"
17. The language which the respondent criticized and sought to modify
was a statement that the "indicia of title" retained by the plaintiff in
Harvin "at most might be termed an unrecorded reservation of title which
would not be effective as against subsequent creditors without notice."
288 S. C. 352, 356. Respondent's Brief, p. 19, in -which the respondent
stated that the language "mnight be regarded as highly prejudicial to
respondent's cause here."
18. 239 S.C. 250, 122 S. C. 2d 640 (1961).
19. CODE oF LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 57-308 (1952).
20. CODE OF LAws OF SouTH CAROLINA, § 60-101 (1952).
21. As to the financing, see comments in Harvin.
22. 213 S. C. 156,48 S. E. 2d 627 (1948).
1962]
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doctrine. In the trial below the judge had held that the
Motor Vehicle Title Act did not apply, against the contrary
contention by the intervenor. The appellant excepted but
abandoned this ground on appeal, and the Court decided the
case without considering the act.23 It is obvious, in any event,
that Harvin, the earlier case, and Young, the later, would
be determinative even if the act were considered.
The sweeping generalization in Russell Willis, Inc. v. Page,
on which these cases depend, that "Ordinarily one in pos-
session of personal property is presumed to be the owner an2
one purchasing such property is required to use only reason-
able diligence to ascertain if there are any defects in the title
thereto," while stating perhaps an acceptable principle doe.
not resolve particular cases - since in each case the question
remains whether the party dealing with the apparent owner
has used reasonable diligence. The purchaser in Young -
not a dealer or an automobile financer - could hardly be
expected to do more than take the word of his seller that
he could sell; and it is possible that even if there had been
a recording of a reservation of title, the purchaser would have
been protected under the theory of implied consent, which
has been discussed. In the other two cases, the seller took
the affirmative step of withholding the usual 'papers, but
failed to record anything. There was no trust in the purchas-
ing dealer's word alone. The mortgagee in these two cases
- coincidentally it was the same Stephenson Finance Com-
pany - relied simply on the dealer's word. In each case
the dealer was not, it turned out, worthy of trust; yet as
between the seller who did not trust by keeping the papers,
and the financer which did trust in not demanding to see
them, the former was the loser. The writer is not familiar
with the practices of finance companies in taking mortgages
from dealers, but he ventures the guess that the normal
practice is to ask for papers, and it is not the less normal
because in individual cases previous experience has been
satisfactory and no loss has been caused.
All three of these cases, it has been seen, were based on
transactions prior to repeal in 1960 of the requirement for
recording. Cases arising from transactions since that time
of course are no longer to be considered in that light. The
question naturally is presented whether recordation would
23. This case (Dort) is cited and relied on in the Young case.
[Vol. 1,5
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be necessary to protect a lienholder - including the reserver
of ownership - where the person creating the security in-
terest is a dealer. Under § 46-139.81 of the 1952 Code, Supp.,
noted by the Court in Harvin, the requirement for protec-
tion of security interests is not applicable to "a security in-
terest on a vehicle created by a manufacturer or dealer who
holds the vehicle for sale." Assuming that a dealer who
creates the interest at the time of purchase from his seller
- so that at the precise time he does not as yet hold the
vehicle for sale - is nevertheless included in this descrip-
tion, the security interest so created need not be represented
on any certificate of title. The 1960 insertion into § 46-139.82
of the 1952 South Carolina Code, Supp., (at the same time
that Section 25 of the 1952 act requiring recordation was
repealed) of the provision "No other recordation shall be
necessary to protect the interest of the lienholders," clearly
dispenses with the necessity of recordation where the security
interest has been perfected (emphasis added). It would ap-
pear that where there has been no perfection of a security
interest under the act because none has been required, as
in the case of a dealer, the general requirements of record-
ing have not been dispensed with; so that a dealer's crea-
tion of a security interest would continue to be governed by
the recording acts - the Bailment Statute or the General
Recording Act. Indeed, it might be argued that even before
the 1960 legislation, the result would have been the same even
if Section 25 had not been enacted as part of the original act
- that is, at least as far as mortgages or similar security
interests created by dealers were concerned.
LEGISLATION
Bailment Statute
The Bailment Statute 4 was amended by the 1962 General
Assembly 25 by the addition of the following sentence between
the first and second (last) sentences of the statute:
In the case of a subsequent mortgage for value of the
property for valuable consideration without notice, the
instrument evidencing such- subsequent mortgage must
be filed for record in order for the holder to claim
under this section as a subsequent mortgagee for value
24. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 57-308 (1952).
25. Act No. 867, 52 Stat. 2153 (1962).
1962] 213
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 18
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/18
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
without notice and the priority shall be determined by
the time of filing for record.
The obvious purpose of the amendment is to make the
Bailment Statute consistent in its operation with the General
Recording Act20 as a "notice-race" type of statute. The
General Recording Act was amended in 195827 to bring it
into the "notice-race" category - that is, that the subsequent
party, who has qualified otherwise as a bona fide purchaser
or encumbrancer for value without notice, must, in order to
obtain priority, record before the recordation of the in-
strument against which he would be protected. No similar
qualification was then provided by legislation for the Bailment
Statute, which is essentially a recording act ;28 and the present
legislation was designed to require, harmoniously, the same
procedure for protection of the subsequent party in situa-
tions falling under the Bailment Statute as under the larger
act.2  In one respect, however, there is a material difference;
26. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 60-101 (1952).
27. Act No. 939, 50 Stat. 1958 (1958).
28, If consistency is to be thoroughly achieved, other recording acts
perhaps should be similarly amended. For example, the statutes dealing
with recordation of assignments of mortgages - CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, §§ 60-103 et seq (1952); the statute covering mortgages for
future advances - CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA, §45-55 (1952).
There are others.
28a. There is one unusual aspect to both amendments - to the General
Recording Act and the Bailment Statute. Although it is stated in the text
that priority is accorded to the subsequent party only if he first records,
the exact langauge in the amendment to Recording Act is ".... the instru-
ment evidencing such subsequent conveyance or subsequent lien must be
filed for record (italics supplied) in order for its holder to claim under
this section as a subsequent creditor or purchaser for value without notice,
and the priority shall be determined by the time of filing for record (italics
supplied)."; and the exact language in the amendment to the Bailment
Statute is "... . the instrument evidencing such subsequent mortgage inust
be filed for record (italics supplied) in order for the holder to claim under
this section as a subsequent mortgagee for value without notice and the
priority shall be determined by the time of filing for record (italics sup-
plied)." This would seem to give priority to later party if he first filed
for record, rather than having had the paper, recorded. Filing is not the
same as recording in order to constitute constructive notice. Bamberg v.
Harrison, 89 S. C. 454, 71 S. E. 1086 (1911). Cf. Sternberger v. McSween,
14 S. C. 35 (1880). Only when the paper is indexed is there such notice.
CODE OF LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 60-156 (1952). Whether the distinc-
tion between filing for record and recording was in the legislative mind,
and whether if so there was deliberate discrimination between the two in
the amendments is a matter of conjecture. Recording, rather than filing,
would seem to be necessary as to subsequent parties, and there may arise
the interesting case of a purchaser or encumbrancer who filed before the
prior party had recorded but whose paper was not entered on the indexes
until after a still later party had become a purchaser or encumbrancer and
had actually recorded first. Leaving aside the complication of the still
later third party in the case just posed, what is the "race" in the "notice-
race" description of the statute? Is it a race between recording by the
13
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the General Recording Act's amendment requires prior re-
cording by a subsequent purchaser of real estate, as well as
by subsequent lien holders of real and personal property;
the amendment to the Bailment Statute makes no mention
of purchasers of affected chattels. The reason is that pur-
chasers of chattels under absolute or unconditional bills of
sale are not required to record these instruments for their
protection.2 9 In this respect the amendment to the Bailment
Statute accords with the similar omission from the amend-
ment to the General Recording Act of any requirement that
purchasers of chattels record first in order to obtain preced-
ence over prior undisclosed parties - an implicit recognition
of the lack of duty on such purchasers to record in the first
instance.
The amendment to the General Recording Act refers broadly
to "subsequent lien creditors" - which would embrace
mortgagees, judgment creditors and other lienors. Although
the Bailment Statute affords protection to both lien creditors
and simple contract creditors, the amendment to the statute
places the requirement for prior recording upon subsequent
mortgagees only. AppArently the status of creditors other
than mortgagees is unaffected by the amendment.3 0
Installment Loans - Real Estate Mortgages
Section 8-233 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina,
which dealt with certain installment loans, was amended81
in the 1962 session of the General Assembly. The unamended
statute permitted banks and other lending agencies to make
installment loans of not less than $10 or more than $1,000
over a period of not less than six months, with a permissible
interest charge of not more than seven per cent on the whole
of the original principal - in the language of the statute,
prior party and recording by the subsequent party; or a race between re-
cording by the prior party and filing by the subsequent party; or a race
between filing by the prior party and filing by the subsequent party?
29. Mather-James Co. v. Wilson, 172 S. C. 387, 174 S. E. 265 (1933);
G.M.A.C. v. Anderson, 172 S. C. 395, 173 S. E. 268 (1933). The same is
all the more true in the multitudinous cases where the sale takes place
without a writing; there is nothing to record.
30. In some of these cases there is nothing to be recorded. See Nesbitt
v. Whitlock, 113 S. C. 519, 101 S. E. 822 (1919), lien for repairs; Tucker
v. Hudgens, 132 S. C. 374, 129 S. E. 77 (1925), pledge. Even a creditor
who had reduced his claim to judgment might not be a lien cteditor, since,
in order to obtain a lien on personal property, he must levy under his
judgment. CoD OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 10-1711 (1952).
31. Act No. 762, 52 Stat. 1882 (1962).
1962] 215
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"just as if the entire amount of the debt matured on the
date the last installment becomes due." No reference was
made to any security for such a loan. The 1962 amendment
changes the statute by permitting installment loans of not
less than $10 or more than $7500, over a period of not less
than three months "and on all such loans [banks, etc,] are
allowed to make interest or add-on charges at the rate of
not exceeding seven per cent, per annum just as if the entire
amount of the debt had matured on the date the last install-
ment becomes due." Thus, in addition to a removal of limita-
tion of time, the change is that the allowable amount on
which interest may be charged on the original, rather than
the reduced, principal is increased from $1000 to $7500. The
amendment, however, carries this important proviso: ' pro-
vided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to
loans secured by mortgages on real estate." There is no
mention of the consequences of attempting to secure such
loans by real estate mortgage, and it is not clear whether
such a mortgage securing an installment loan under the
section would be a nullity, or whether the giving of the
mortgage would produce usury in, the obligation with a cor-
responding taint in, but not invalidity of, the mortgage.
216
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